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 The Art of Mooting: Mooting and the Cognitive Domain 
Mark Thomas and Lucy Cradduck 
School of Law, Queensland University of Technology 
Abstract 
Mooting is modeled principally on appellate advocacy.  However, the skill set developed by 
participating in a moot program – being that necessary to persuade someone to your preferred position 
– is indispensible to anyone practising law. Developing effective mooting skills in students necessitates 
the engagement of coaches with an appropriate understanding of the theories underlying mooting and 
advocacy practice and their interconnection with each other. This article explains the relevance of the 
cognitive domain to mooting performance and places it in context with the psychomotor and affective 
domains. 
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Introduction 
Coaching plays an indispensable and crucial role in the process of preparing mooting 
teams for competition at all levels. Enabling effective coaching is a key strategic 
component for any law school seeking to develop a culture of excellence in mooting. 
While the development of plausible and meritorious arguments in response to 
the issues raised in a moot problem is primarily an intellectual exercise, its 
presentation in competition involves all of the domains of human mental activity – 
cognitive, psychomotor and affectivei. Each domain has identifiable skills (Anderson 
& Krathwohl, 2001), which the authors argue are capable of development through 
targeted practice for a competition mooting team with the aim of excellent 
performance.  The authors’ consider, however, that without successfully mastering the 
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skills of the cognitive domain it is unlikely a team would be successful, and that a 
principal focus of coaching a moot team necessitates an understanding of the theory 
of learning that underpins cognitive development. 
As a learning and teaching function within a law school, mooting should be 
predicated and structured on supportable principles of learning. Indeed, it is one area 
of clinical training to which Hoffman’s observation that “no doctrine or theory 
underlies many lawyering skills” does not apply (Hoffman, 1994, 105): there is ample 
theory which is closely targeted on the lawyering skills being developed in a 
successful mooter. The “stuff” of lawyering, manifest in the practical skills of 
mooting, need not be consigned to the cartographical unknowability of Blasi’s 
“[h]ere there be dragons” (Blasi, 1995, 316) but can be meaningfully enhanced by 
the “appropriation of theory into cognitive apparatus of practitioners” (for which 
read students)  (Blasi, 1995, 317). 
 
Importantly, coaches should be aware of the impact each domain has on 
performance. This article explores the theories behind the art of mooting, adopting 
McFarlane’s (1992) notion of the relationship between high-level synthesisation and 
evaluation of knowledge in performance – i.e. the fusion of (mental) knowledge and 
action conceptualized by Webb as “artistry” (Webb, 1995). Beyond mere positivist 
legal explication, the moot demands the “arts” (as Schön would characterise them) of 
problem framing, of implementation, and of improvisation, “all necessary to mediate 
the use in practice of applied [knowledge] and technique” (Schön, 1987, 13). The 
article analyses these art forms in the context of a discussion and elaboration of the 
cognitive domain and its relevance for coaching a mooting team.  
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The authors’ consideration of the cognitive domain is based in the application 
of a Bloom-based taxonomy of cognitive skills and learning objectives. Cognitive 
skills have been the subject of considerable research and classification. However, 
there has been disagreement about the positioning of particular skills, and the extent 
to which the higher-level skills are independent, or above a threshold operate inter-
relationally. While there is recent literature that links all three domains together in the 
educational context (Hansen, 2008; Rovai et al, 2009), a gap exists in the literature as 
to their relevance to the art of mooting. This article begins to fill that gap. 
The role of the mooting coach 
Mooting is an established mechanism for assessment within many law schools and a 
mechanism for delivery of essential skills training (Keyes & Whincop, 1997). It also 
can be used for non-assessment purposes in the context of competition moots that 
students participate in on a voluntary basis, or as an optional form of assessment in 
select subjects (Lynch, 1996). The role of the coach, or even the ability to have one, 
will vary depending on the assessment context – if used for class assessment the 
ability to have a coach may not be permitted. Where mooting is used for assessment, 
the marking tools would use a matrix of criteria and standards suitable for a criterion-
referenced mode of assessment. The role of the academic in developing the criteria 
will be crucial and, the authors suggest, benefit from an understanding of the matters 
the authors will discuss here and in later research. The focus of this article, however, 
is on the role of the coach in competition mooting, referred to by some authors as 
“appellate simulation” (McDevitt, 2009, 247). 
The crucial role played by coaching in any competitive endeavour is readily 
seen in the salaries commanded by coaches of elite athletes and sporting teams, and 
the readiness of teams to change coaches when their performance does not meet 
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reasonable expectations.  In the context of mooting in law schools, as in sport ii , 
coaching is not merely supervising practice and making useful suggestions based on 
the coach’s own expertise and experience, or providing answers. Successful coaching 
in any activity involves dissecting the activity involved, identifying the skills and 
attitudes which are the fundamentals of excellent performance, and developing a 
coherent plan for exercises to develop those skills at appropriate stages of preparation. 
In traditional coaching success is achieved when the coach, as an expert 
puppeteer, orchestrates the actions of players according to his own vision. 
(Skura, 2007) 
Contrary to the idea of coaching described above as “traditional”, the 
description of principles and practices described here approaches the role of coaches 
as facilitators rather than puppeteers.  The raw materials of a moot team are students 
who, when competing, are cut free of all strings other than the ideas and practices 
assimilated from the coaching process, which then become their own resources. 
These, by necessity, are exercised in an unpredictable environment and must therefore 
be used flexibly, adapting to the particular circumstances revealed during a moot 
hearing.  
Even if coaches were permitted to write submissions, performance in 
competition would be compromised if participants had not developed and assimilated 
the relevant materials and arguments themselves.  Assimilation is most effectively 
achieved under the guidance of a coach who constructs practice experiences 
conducive to the development of the skills necessary for high-level competition 
performance. Knowledge by the coach of the three domains will be essential. 
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The cognitive domain in context 
It is tempting to think the cognitive domain dominates moot preparation in the form of 
the intellectual process necessary to create an unassailable argument as to why one 
party should prevail – ie the process of identifying the legal issue/s, researching the 
extant law and applying it to the factual matrix in the problem. Certainly these 
intellectual processes are essential to successful mooting.  A lack of understanding of 
the factual and legal information relevant to the problem will inevitably lead to a 
poor, and equally inevitably embarrassing, performance. However, mooting, like 
practice at the bar or as a solicitor advocate, is more than just an intellectual process. 
The skills associated with successful mooting, or legal practice cover the 
entire range of domains of human activity:  intellectual, physical and emotional.  That 
is to say – full preparation for a mooting campaign requires development of cognitive 
skills (in terms of legal analysis of the moot problem and development of a coherent 
and sustainable argument); psychomotor skills (in terms of the control of physical 
processes displayed while in competition); and the affective domain (involving the 
psychological and emotional aspects of preparation and competition).iii 
The presentation of argument in competition, however, is not a sterile 
intellectual exercise.  The preparation for, and participation in, a mooting competition 
are equally dependent on the physical aspects of oral submissions from the bar table 
(such as vocal qualities and dynamics, control of nervous habits, government of 
physical gesture and facial expression); and psychological factors such as personal 
interactions (including within a team, with the coach and with opposing teams and the 
Bench), controlling the inevitable anxiety and developing confidence. Mastering these 
latter domains, however, is inextricably linked to, and builds from, mastery of the 
cognitive domain.  
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The theoretical foundation: Bloom’s (revised and revisited) Taxonomy 
The authors’ discussion of the cognitive domain builds from Dr Benjamin Bloom’s 
seminal work, Taxonomy of educational objectives: the classification of educational 
goals: Handbook I: Cognitive Domain (Bloom et al, 1956). The specific levels and 
their interrelation with each other, however, have been adapted to the specific context 
of mooting in the light of later modification (by other authors) of Bloom’s taxonomy.   
 Bloom et al (1956) described six levels of cognitive activity – know, 
comprehend, apply, analyse, synthesise and evaluate – with various sub-levels. Each 
of the higher levels was considered dependent on successful engagement with the 
lower levels in the hierarchy. In applying Blooms’ taxonomy, lower levels must be 
mastered and mastery demonstrated before embarking on the higher-level skills. 
However, the lower level skills must be retained throughout, as they remain the basis 
for the demonstration and implementation of the higher-level skills.  
 The linear progression of the six levels raised concerns. Other authors 
questioned the strict requirement of sequential development across the all levels, 
regarding the first three as sequential and the second three as parallel (Furst, 1994). 
While not entering into that debate, the authors consider that, at least in the context of 
the preparation of legal argument, the levels of application and analysis do not 
function wholly as discrete activities.  Applying and analysing the extant law arguably 
function in tandem or may, we would argue, even be reversed, while the three higher 
level skills generally function in parallel.   
 In their 2001 Revised Taxonomy, Anderson and Krathwohl (2001) swapped 
the positions of evaluation and synthesis (Krathwohl, 2002) and changed terminology. 
Remember replaced know; understand replaced comprehend; and create replaced 
synthesis (Krathwohl, 2002).  It is noted that the Revised Taxonomy is not so rigidly 
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sequential as Bloom’s original conception (Seaman, 2011), although Krathwohl 
(2002) expressly describes the revised taxonomy as hierarchical, with an explanation 
that the “mid-points” of each skill would ascend from simple to complex.  (215) 
 Bloom’s Taxonomy, original and revised, has been applied in the subsequent 
decades to a number of disciplines inter alia in the context of content development, 
assessment and assessment tools, specifying learning objects or outcomes; (Hanna, 
2007; Starr, Manaris & Stalvey, 2008; Crowe, Dirks & Wenderoth, 2008; Seaman, 
2011) and to promote “student self-management” (Athanassiou, McNett & Harvey, 
2003, 534). However, it has not been applied as a tool for furthering learning relevant 
to, or assisting in the gaining of the specific skill set required for, competition 
mooting.  
 In the mooting context, the application of either taxonomy presents 
difficulties with the development and presentation of a persuasive legal argument 
addressing a complex legal scenario.  Such a project is not a single or homogenous 
cognitive process. The model adopted for the purposes of this article is both mindful 
of previous debate and the modifications to Bloom’s original taxonomy. The authors’ 
adaptive model is depicted in Figure 1.  
1. Know/Remember (knowing and remembering) 
2. Comprehend/Understand       Hierarchical 
3. Apply (putting into a particular context) 
 
 
4. Analyse (determining the merits of a particular argument) 
5. Evaluate (judgements based on internal and external criteria)   Parallel 
6. Synthesis/Create        
 
Figure 1:  Bloom/Krathwohl - six levels of cognitive skills and development (adapted) 
 
 
Another revision to Bloom’s taxonomy resulted in the creation of a taxonomy 
table (Anderson & Krathwohl, 2001). The original taxonomy was identified as uni-
  
 
8 
dimensional, consisting as it did of the six levels of cognitive skill with a range of 
subcategories in each. The 2001 Revised Taxonomy is constructed as two-
dimensional. The six cognitive processes are positioned on one axis, and the form of 
knowledge the subject of processing (characterised as factual, conceptual, procedural 
and metacognitive) on the other (Krathwohl, 2002).   
In this analysis, the authors identify the relative positioning of the processes in 
this second dimension, particularly with respect to the framing of questions 
appropriate to the development of legal argument as mooters ascend the hierarchy.  
The authors’ characterisation of the taxonomy table is based on the following 
nomenclature and depicted in Table I.iv 
Table I: Revised Taxonomy Table – 2-Dimensional Matrix (after Krathwohl) 
     Cognitive skills dimension 
Knowledge 
dimension 
B1 
Remember 
B2 
Understand 
B3 
Apply 
B4+ 
Analyse, Create and 
Evaluate  
Factual B1(F) B2(F) B3(F) B4+(F) 
Conceptual B1(C) B2(C) B3(C) B4+(C) 
Procedural B1(P) B2(P) B3(P) B4+(P) 
Metacognitive B1(M) B2(M) B3(M) B4+(M) 
One of the principal criticisms of Bloom-based taxonomies lies in their 
psychological underpinning of behaviourism (Ferris & Aziz, 2005). This is a view of 
limited attractiveness as it claims to provide a complete explanation of human 
intellectual processes.  To that extent the authors, similarly to other critics (Furst, 
1994; Ferris & Aziz, 2005), do not consider such taxonomies as philosophically 
convincing. The same dissatisfaction with the behaviourist cast of Bloom-based 
taxonomies leads the authors to re-assert the highly re-iterative nature of the thought 
processes involved in developing a complex legal argument, and thus their artistic 
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credentials. These processes constantly cross boundaries between the identified 
elements of the taxonomy, while at the same time being deeply imbricated in both 
affective and psychomotor performance.  However, this analysis nonetheless adopts 
these classifications as a convenient model within which to analyse the intellectual 
processes involved in high level mooting in order to evaluate observed behaviour and 
frame appropriate coaching strategies.   
Experience of preparing teams for mooting competitions suggests that the 
upper three levels function in parallel, at least to the extent that analysis, synthesis and 
evaluation are interrelated, and efficiency requires that all three be utilised in making 
appropriate decisions about the content of the underlying argument/s presented by the 
team.  Once the threshold has been passed of knowing and understanding the 
underlying factual matrix and legal principles and reasoning processes, then analysis, 
synthesis and evaluation become effectively equal partners in the development of 
complex legal argument. Similarly, applying the law to the new facts takes place in 
the context of having analysed the law as it is manifested in other, comparable, cases 
(which requires engaging the analytical level prior to the application level). 
Preparation for a mooting competition requires the engagement of all these skills.  
However, while they do not operate discretely, there is a clear developmental path for 
the cognitive aspects of moot preparation.  Lower cognitive skills are emphasized at 
the beginning of preparation, with the emphasis moving further up the hierarchy as 
the process continues. 
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the different forms of cognitive 
skills identified by Bloom, as relevant to mooting.  A key difference in this depiction 
of the relationship is that the authors approach the taxonomy of the cognitive domain 
from a three-dimensional perspective.v In this context, the three high-level skills are 
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interrelated, rather than sequential and, as in the legal context generally, are mutually 
interdependent. They also build equally from the lower three levels, such that a lack 
of mastery of any of the three lower levels will impact adversely on any of the three 
higher-level skills. 
 
Figure 2:  The cognitive domain for mooting: 3-Dimensional Context (after Bloom) 
Cognitive skills in context 
The authors’ three-dimensional hierarchy of the cognitive skills of mooting is 
concerned with the intellectual aspects of the development of legal argument 
presented in both written and oral form.  The cognitive goal of preparation for moot 
competition is the synthesis of a persuasive argument relating to a new set of facts.  It 
is not a single enterprise but depends on the staged development of skills as students 
and their coach engage with the legal issues. This commences at the first reading of 
the problem and a tentative formulation of relevant issues, and continues through to 
the final subtle and nuanced argument.  During this process, the mooting team will 
ascend through the cognitive hierarchy, reaching the upper level (which combines 
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analysis, synthesis and evaluation) only once they have effectively assimilated the 
products of the three lower levels. 
The aim of moot training is to arrive at the competition itself fully prepared. 
This requires a fully developed knowledge of relevant facts, an understanding of the 
legal issues raised in the problem, comprehension of the extant law governing the 
resolution of the problem, which is applied to the new scenario, synthesising and 
evaluating a unique solution based on the proper application of the earlier stages of 
cognitive skills. It also requires performance skills suitably adapted to successful 
presentation.  
Once the problem is released, the moot team must apply themselves to 
knowing and remembering a vast array of facts. These are more than just the actual 
facts of the problem (B1(F)). Facts in this context also include legal facts about 
doctrinal norms and/or legislation (B1(C)); procedural facts, such as the way in which 
appropriate identified doctrines function in the legal context (B1(P)); and 
metacognitively developing knowledge of the thought processes involved in solving 
the problem (B1(M)).  This range of facts can be classified in terms of the knowledge 
dimension of the 2001 Revised taxonomy table. Most importantly, however, the 
mooting team goes beyond merely knowing these facts, ascending the cognitive 
hierarchy by developing an understanding of the facts in the context of the legal 
principles and rules applicable to the problem (B2(F), (C), (P) & (M)). 
Because the facts of the problem are novel, the team must apply them by 
fusing the known facts with legal principles (B3(F), (C), (P) & (M)). In developing 
arguments for both sides of the problem, the team must analyse closely the arguments 
in related cases; synthesise (ie create) a new product – the argument developed for 
each party; and evaluate each argument, recognising its strengths and weaknesses, 
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and developing strategies to resist counter arguments (B4+(C), (P), & (M)).  We 
designate the cognitive functions engaged at this point as B4+, to signify that they are 
not, we argue, hierarchical, but interdependent (although it is still possible to 
recognise functions which are specifically associated with any of these three 
component cognitive skills). 
Presentation of argument in moot hearings is more than simply reciting a 
written memorandum, or manipulating the concepts in an intellectual sense. While 
essentially content driven, submissions must move beyond “bare propositional 
knowledge” towards what Webb describes as “‘practical knowledge'—that is, the 
knowledge … evident in some skill, proficiency or knack, whether physical and/or 
mental” (Webb, 1995, 190). Performance skills at an appropriate level associated 
with presentation are in themselves not cognitive but features of the psychomotor and 
affective domains to be examined by the authors in subsequent articles.  However it is 
important to note, as depicted above, that the development of the final product of 
moot preparation is entirely dependent on the team having maximised their cognitive 
engagement with the mooting problem.  Practice is essential to developing the 
necessary cognitive skills.  
Developing cognitive skills 
Mooting is a contrived and alien world for law students, who will ordinarily have had 
little experience of anything that approaches the intensity, exposure and vulnerability 
involved in making oral submissions.  Many law students may have been active in 
debating at school, and while this may assist in some technical areas (voice, nerves 
etc), the reality of being interrupted repeatedly during your submissions places 
debating and mooting in quite different areas of experience. 
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The authors note, from their own experiences and as coaches, that no amount 
of practice will ever replicate the reality of standing at the bar table, trying to make 
submissions, and simultaneously being subject to penetrating interrogation by the 
Bench.  For members of moot teams, systematic desensitisation to the realities of 
competition appearance is a key to utilising affective skills in support of the 
presentation of legal argument (Hopf & Ayres, 1992). As far as possible (and 
certainly in the latter stages of preparation), mooting practices should be designed to 
simulate with increasing verisimilitude what mooters will experience in competition.  
This will require presenting to mock Benches. To reach that point, however, requires 
mastery of the cognitive skills through a systematically designed practice program. 
While the following approach to coaching, designed to enable the 
development of cognitive skills in the team is predicated on a hierarchical 
organisation of at least the first three cognitive skills, practices should begin to engage 
the higher-level skills as soon as possible. How soon engagement with higher-level 
skills occurs will depend on the team’s degree of familiarity with the moot problem. 
Evaluation of the performance aspects of the process – specifically peer and self 
evaluation – should also be included as an ongoing feature of coaching, although the 
role of evaluation will become more significant as the competition approaches. 
While the authors’ design for coaching is structured such that levels 1-3 are 
treated independently, this is merely for ease of discussion.  The reality is that as soon 
as preparation begins, all of the cognitive levels are engaged to at least some extent. 
Appropriate coaching is, in effect, a question of shifting the emphasis across the 
period of preparation from the lower level skills towards the higher-level ones.  Thus, 
early practice sessions are geared to the embedding of knowledge.  Without 
knowledge of the facts, no progress is possible.  Soon after the problem is released 
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and students have developed a working knowledge of the relevant facts, however, 
practice sessions can begin to tease out their understanding of the facts in their legal 
context.   Soon after that, comparisons with relevant cases can begin the process of 
application of relevant legal doctrines.  At this stage the B4+ processes become a 
necessary part of taking what otherwise would be a pedestrian and mechanical 
application towards being a creative and closely analysed response to the problem. 
B1:    Remember 
At the earliest stage of preparation the basic requirement is simple knowledge and 
retention of facts.   Without a perfect knowledge of the facts, even competent moot 
performance is impossible.  Knowledge, however, includes not just facts as ordinarily 
understood, but facts about classifications (ie recognition of the specific roles which 
legal actors are ascribed in the legal context) and a factual knowledge of legal 
method.  In this context, knowledge of facts will also include knowledge of legal 
materials, such as legislation and relevant propositions of law regarding the type of 
legal dispute involved and a reflective component about how students are engaging at 
this level of the development process.   In other words “knowledge” in this context 
encompasses the four classes of things which are the subject of memory (B1(F), 
B1(C), B1(P) and B1(M)).  
Facts in this broad sense include matters that are purely court procedures, 
(B1(F)) which must be remembered and executed flawlessly (even though they have 
no bearing on the substantive problem). For example, establishing the proper mode of 
address for the members of the Bench (ie your Excellency for the International 
Criminal Court), and using that form in all practice runs.  
At this level coaching must be undertaken in a structured manner – flexibility 
can be introduced at higher levels. Early practice sessions should focus on drills 
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(either solo or with others) designed to embed at a deep level the facts (in the 
expanded sense) of the moot problem.   Individual mooters should be encouraged to 
run through the moot problem at idle moments, identifying parts of the problem 
which are less easily remembered (for example) so that extra time can be dedicated to 
these. The aim of this approach is to embed the facts of the problem to a depth such 
that the answer to any factual question (whether necessary for higher level processes 
in developing the final argument, or simply in response to questions from the bench) 
is immediately available to the mooter. 
In order to achieve the desired knowledge retention, early practice sessions 
should be conducted at a basic level. These preliminary sessions should be designed 
to ensure, as far as practicable, relevant facts are immediately accessible without 
needing to look up details.  The same is true for the sources of this information (ie  a 
particular fact can be verified in an evidentiary sense by reference to “paragraph yy 
of the Affidavit of X”).  Practice at this level does not require a simulated Bench or 
courtroom, and can involve: group activities, such as roundtable recitation of the 
sequence of events; paired mooters quizzing each other; and/or individual mooters 
reading/cataloguing facts.  A detailed chronology of events should be prepared and 
form the basis for a structured knowledge and understanding of relevant information. 
There are specific advantages in holding sessions in which team members 
question each other. In doing so the questioner, as well as the questioned, are 
developing their own familiarity with the factual scenario. In framing questions, the 
mooter will require active exposure to the factual matrix surrounding the problem. 
Similar processes can be replicated as the field of factual information widens (ie to 
include factual material relevant to authorities). Once practice has moved beyond 
simple knowledge, the emphasis on B1 questions will fall off as higher-level skills are 
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engaged. B1 skills, however, will continue to be important and will need to be 
maintained, as answering application or analytical questions requires access to the 
remembered facts. 
 B2:    Comprehend/Understand 
Comprehension is more than mere knowledge as it demonstrates an 
understanding of facts in context. It involves the ability to organize and compare facts 
and interpret them in context.  While technical application of Bloom suggests that 
knowledge precedes comprehension, in designing a practice schedule, it is neither 
necessary nor effective to compartmentalise these two functions.  Practicing to 
increase comprehension can and should, in fact, begin as soon as a working 
knowledge (as opposed to a comprehensive one) of the moot problem is established.  
Practices now should, for example, expand the questioning session to 
incorporate digressive questions requiring a comparison of the facts in other cases, 
with emphasis not merely on the factual differences, but the legal significance of any 
identified differences. That is, the mooters begin to incorporate an understanding of 
the legal principles relevant to the problem presented (B2(F), (P), (C) & (M)).  
At this level the coach should work to evolve the practice sessions into both 
group and individual drill sessions. Drill sessions are designed to develop 
comprehension of the broadening range of facts and the interrelationships between 
them, and the significance of similarities and differences. The questioning sessions 
retain aspects of those relevant to developing B1 skills, continuing the process of 
automation of knowledge of facts, core doctrines and applicable legislation. However, 
in order to expand beyond B1 skills, the sessions should now be designed to require 
team members to articulate connections between facts and their context (B2(F) & 
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(C)).  Questions should no longer be asked in isolation but structured as sequences of 
questions, commencing with a B1 question or questions leading to a B2 question. This 
progressive development of questions is designed to reveal an understanding of the 
elicited fact/s in relation to a known legal principle, and is reflective of the style used 
when presenting submissions to the Bench. 
At this level answers to questions should be framed in language that is 
appropriate to responding to questions from the Bench. This includes addressing 
using formal titles (B1(F)). Adopting this answering style reflects and reinforces core 
B1 skills. For the coach, by insisting on appropriate address even at early stages, he or 
she is assisting the team members to embed what will be an important aspect of their 
competition performance.  Many mooters have become flustered when being pulled 
up for addressing the Bench incorrectly, compromising the presentation of their 
argument.  Embedding at an early stage means the mooter will not need to think about 
it in competition, as it will have become second nature. 
 B3:   Apply 
Application moves beyond comprehension as it involves using knowledge in a 
new context, requiring knowledge of the new situation itself (the factual matrix of the 
problem and how it may be demonstrated as involving the same legal principles) and 
acquiring knowledge of the appropriate and permissible principles and methods that 
may be used to solve the problem. It builds from B2 skills as it also requires 
knowledge of comparable factual scenarios, which demonstrate how similar or related 
problems have been solved in the past.  
By this stage of the coaching process the framework for the legal arguments 
presented in the competition will be established and a draft memorandum/memorial 
will have been prepared.  The refinement of both oral and written submissions is 
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driven by knowledge and comprehension of the problem (B1 and B2); an expanding 
base of relevant authorities ((B3(C), (P)); analysis of the moot problem (B4+(C), 
(P))vi; and an understanding of the principles that apply to the facts as they emerge 
from relevant authorities.  Successfully undertaking this process requires the 
development of at least B3 skills. 
In order to develop the B3 skill set the coach should structure practice sessions 
as though the mooter is presenting oral submissions to the Bench on particular aspects 
of the argument being developed. This introduces an element of performance and 
simulation of the ambience of competition.  Even at this stage the mooter should 
retain all the formal and procedural aspects of forensic practice (such as appropriate 
forms of address, language and demeanour) (B1(F)). The coach should continue to 
encourage the embedding of courtroom etiquette so that in the competition the 
mooter’s performance is natural and instinctive.   What also is being developed at this 
stage is the basic structure of the argument on each particular issue.   
The competition preparations should by now have developed to the point where 
somewhere around four to six issues have crystallised as contentious. Practices should 
be similarly structured as this will have governed the structure of the memorandum 
and will also govern the oral submissions.  Importantly, the coach should work with 
the team to ensure that each issue, and the mooter’s resolution of it, should be able to 
be encapsulated in a simple explanation of the issue and its resolution.  Practice now 
moves to a focus on individual submissions.  From a practical perspective, all 
members of a team should practice both junior and senior counsel roles on behalf of 
both parties. The coach should work to ensure that each team member is able (at the 
very minimum) to to provide adequate responses to questions from the Bench on all 
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the issues being argued (even if they are not part of that individual’s own 
submissions).   
Most importantly, practice questioning sessions should now begin to look at the 
argument on a particular issue as a whole. These sessions retain aspects of B1 skills 
serving to continue the process of "automation" of knowledge of facts, core doctrines, 
applicable legislation, and their comprehension in a limited context.  Questions are 
now structured as more complex sequences, with B1 and B2 questions setting the 
groundwork for a B3 question. A B3 question will typically require the mooter to 
address the application of the law to a specific issue in the expectation that 
understanding of the facts and legal principles are already well developed, and will be 
embedded in their responses. 
B4+:    Analysis, Create and Evaluation 
Attaining B4 skills will fully equip the mooter for competition performance and, 
importantly, judging: 
Dialogue between the judge and counsel provides the opportunity 
for instructors to assess higher level skills of analysis and 
evaluation rather than lower level skills such as recall of 
knowledge. (Bentley, 1996, 117) 
The interdependence of the three B4+ skills reflects the observations of 
cognitive science that the differentiation between naïve and expert professional skills 
–and mooting is the attempt to engender something of the expert in the neophyte -  
lies not in the mere accumulation of detailed knowledge, but in the quality of its 
organization, thus allowing for an approach to  the moot problem which transcends 
mere application of a “stored problem schema” to a recognised problem structure 
(Blasi, 1995, 318). 
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This is in some ways the most crucial time for the coach, as the final stage, the 
competition, is beyond their control. This stage of practice engages the three B4+ 
skills contemporaneously.  Practice sessions should now be based around presentation 
of the whole argument, moving towards rehearsals of the entire presentation (both 
counsels and covering all issues).  Since this is still a work-in-progress, however, 
questioning should be directed at any arguments not been fully tested, developing 
what Schön (1983) would describe as “reflection-in-action” in the form of the ability 
to “respond creatively to a problematic situation while in the midst of that situation” 
(Webb ,1995, 198). 
 There are now a finite number of opportunities to practice and perfect 
submissions and style while retaining the intuitive flexibility to deal with the 
unknown.  The coach and team members must work together at this level. The team 
should be analysing the content of the argument and bringing to bear their knowledge 
of approaches taken in comparable cases. In turn, the coach should be running critical 
(B4+) questions past counsel during their presentations to expose weaknesses.  It is 
good strategy to include non-speaking mooter/s as members of the practice Bench – 
responding to arguments presented to the Bench focuses them on high-level aspects of 
the case, but also gives them a view of mooting which allows them to see other 
peoples’ performance aspects, such as posture, facial expressions and demeanour and 
providing a basis for them to reflect critically on their own. 
The team presentations should now have all the hallmarks of 
creation/synthesis. That is, they should combine all known information into a unique 
solution. The solution should be based in a set of abstract relationships between fact 
and law, including legal rules and novel construction of arguments where, as should 
be the case in any well-set problem, no extant rule is determinative.  Submissions 
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should navigate the “problem space” (to adopt a term from cognitive science) with a 
view to providing a legal solution which encompasses “local” decisions (about, for 
example, how specific legal doctrines or cases might be applied to the novel space) in 
the context of an overarching sensitivity to their role in the global solution (Blasi 
1995, 331).  
A primary purpose of these later practices is to provide the coach and the team 
with the opportunity for evaluation of the arguments that have been developed. This 
requires a high level manifestation of analysing existing arguments in cognate, though 
not wholly co-extensive, situations.  It is this interrelationship of evaluation, synthesis 
and analysis which re-enforces our view that the three higher-level functions do not 
operate hierarchically, even though they retain their own distinctive characteristics. 
This is not a situation where the coach’s view should necessarily prevail.  Everyone 
should retain an open mind as to how the argument/s will develop. Self-evaluation 
and peer-evaluation are equally important at this time as everyone’s critical evaluation 
of the current form of arguments is valuable input into this process of synthesisation 
(Vanaspu et al, 2009). 
This is the time to consider the strategic aspects of the arguments to be 
presented. This includes determining the order of the submissions, which counsel is to 
speak first and whether later submissions depend on earlier ones succeeding. At this 
stage the evaluation is directed not just to the cognitive aspects of the argument but 
will begin to review performance characteristics linked to persuasiveness of the 
mooter. It is at this time that the affective and psychomotor domains as they are 
observable in presentation will need to be reinforced.  
Practice sessions should now, in effect, be full ‘rehearsals’. Questions from the 
practice Bench should be focused on higher level skills (B4+) but should not entirely 
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abandon B1-B3 processing.  At any stage, mooters can and should be asked, for 
example, to take the Bench to the specific reference where a fact is authoritatively 
stated in the materials or where a judge sets out a proposition of law being relied on 
(both B1(F)).  Questions that demonstrate active knowledge of cases (how the Bench 
was constituted; was the judge cited in the majority or in dissent), which are also 
Bl(F) level, should be interspersed with more complex B3 and B4+ questions.  As this 
is now full rehearsal, any lapses in protocol or etiquette should be dealt with by the 
Bench in character, thereby not breaking the ambience of actual performance. 
Conclusion 
Many coaches – particularly those with some years’ experience of high-level 
mooting – may have developed an instinctive understanding of the various levels of 
mental processing which go into developing and presenting a strong legal argument in 
response to a moot problem.  Similarly, they will also have developed through 
experience some understanding of the inter-relationship between cognitive, 
psychomotor and affective domains in the making of excellent oral submissions, 
without necessarily having a theoretical understanding of those domains.   
Coaches also have their own personal advocacy style – some more effective 
than others.  This is paper is not intended to suggest standardisation of coaching to the 
extent that it intrudes into the style of an individual coach.  However, even where 
coaches have developed an unarticulated sense of the underlying taxonomies, it is a 
valuable exercise for coaches to reflect on their methods by reference to the 
underlying theory, and to take the opportunity to refine coaching practices against a 
model which places all aspects of excellence in moot performance in a rational and 
coherent space justified by reference to relevant educational theory. 
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Notes 
i  While it is noted that other authors consider there is a fourth domain – the social domain 
(for example see Dettmer, P. (2006) New Blooms in Established Fields: Four Domains 
of Learning and Doing, Roeper Review 28(2), pp.70-78) – in the context of competition 
mooting the authors suggest the social aspect has limited (if any) impact and as such will 
not be considered by them. 
ii  The adoption of sporting metaphors as a general method of modeling “workplace” 
behaviour has gained considerable traction, (see Hanley, S. (2010) A Sports Metaphor in 
Career Coaching, Career Planning and Adult Development Journal, 26, pp. 96-100) 
which has special resonance for moot coaching, insofar as it is embedded in a 
competitive and performance related environment 
iii  Compare the approach described in relation to engineering education, where “[t]he 
traditional learning goals of engineering curricula have focused on foundational 
knowledge, computational skills and their application. That, outcomes stress cognitive 
domain development  Despite the recognition that attitudinal and behavioural 
dimensions are critically integrated, the cognitive domain is the focus”: Vanaspu, L., 
Stolk, J. and Herta, R. (2009) The Four-Domain Development Diagram: A Guide for 
Holistic Design of Effective Learning Experiences for the Twenty-First Century 
Engineer, Journal of Engineering Education, 98, pp. 67-81at 68. 
iv  Developed from the State of Minnesota’s Language Arts Standards for Grade 12, 
extracted in Krathwohl, D. (2002) A Revision of Bloom’s Taxonomy: An Overview, 
Theory into Practice, 42(4), pp. 212-218 at 216 – see Appendix Figure 4. 
v   This model is not to be confused with the Confluent Three-Dimensional Taxonomy 
proposed by Feezel. See – Feezel, J. (1985) Toward a confluent taxonomy of cognitive, 
affective, and psychomotor abilities in communication, Communication Education, 
34(1), pp. 1-11 
vi  This reinforces the authors’ position that application and analysis, at least in the context 
of competition mooting, do not follow any neat sequential pattern nor do they operate 
iteratively. 
